The Clash Between Congress and the White House over Information: Are Contempt Citations the Answer? by Schachner, Natalie
 1 
Natalie Schachner 
1/22/08 
 
The Congressional Contempt Power: A Lethal Weapon in the Battle 
over Information? 
Introduction 
According to Representative Henry A. Waxman of the House 
Oversight Committee, “A subpoena is not a request; it’s a demand 
for information.”1  Waxman’s words cut to the heart of the 
ongoing controversy between the Congress and the White House 
over two competing powers: Congressional oversight and executive 
privilege.   
The dispute centers on Congressional investigations into the 
firing of eight U.S. attorneys (nearly ten percent of America’s 
top prosecutors2) in December 2006.  Earlier in that same year, 
the USA Patriot Act was reauthorized to include a provision that 
allowed Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales to appoint 
replacement prosecutors on an indefinite basis, without approval 
                                                
1 Dan Eggen and Paul Kane, Hill Subpoenas Approved for Rice, 
Other Bush Officials; As Democrats Seek Administration Testimony 
on Various Issues, Ex-Justice Aide Receives Limited Immunity, 
Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 2007, at A5. 
2 Neal Katyal, Prosecution Complex, N.Y.Times, Mar. 27, 2007, at 
A19. 
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by the Senate.3  The connection between the amended Patriot Act 
and these firings has prompted much speculation over whether the 
firings were motivated by the political agenda of the Bush 
Administration. Many have questioned whether “some of the U.S. 
attorneys were fired because they were investigating Republican 
wrongdoing too energetically or not investigating Democrats 
vigorously enough in the view of the White House.”4 One Senator 
said that the firings “reek of politics” and “[e]ven the hiring 
and firing of our top federal prosecutors has become infused and 
corrupted with political, rather than prudent, considerations.”5   
Justice Department officials repeatedly affirmed that the 
firings were based on personnel decisions related to the 
prosecutors “performance-related” problems. However, on March 2, 
2007, “officials acknowledged that the ousters were based 
                                                
3 See id.; USA Patriot Act Improvement Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-77, 120 Stat. 192 (2006)(codified as 
amended in scattered sections and titles of the United States 
Code).  
4 Joe Hilyard, Your Opinions, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Mar. 
26, 2007, at A8.  Note that since this article was published, 
one more U.S. attorney was fired, for a total of nine. 
5 Dan Eggen, Deputy Attorney General Defends Prosecutor Firings, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 2007, at A3.  
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primarily on the administration’s unhappiness with the 
prosecutors’ policy decisions and revealed the White House’s 
role in the matter.”6  In response to the speculation over the 
political nature of the firings, Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales stated,  
I acknowledge that mistakes were made here.  I accept the 
responsibility.  And my pledge to the American people is to 
find out what went wrong here, to access accountability and to 
make improvements so that the mistakes that occurred in this 
instance do not occur again in the future.7   
 
On August 27, 2007, Alberto Gonzales resigned.8 
Outraged by the political scandal currently tainting the 
Department of Justice, Congress has taken action to investigate 
the circumstances surrounding the firings.  In pursuit of 
answers, Congress has issued subpoenas ordering members of the 
Bush Administration, including Karl Rove, Chief of Staff, Joshua 
Bolten, and former White House counsel Harriet Miers, to testify 
                                                
6 John Solomon and Dan Eggen, White House Backed U.S. Attorney 
Firings, Officials Say, Wash Post, Mar. 3, 2007 at A1. 
7 Ruth Marcus, Time to Go, Mr. Gonzales, Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 
2007, at A15. 
8 See Philip Shenon & David Johnston, A Defender of Bush’s Power, 
Gonzales Resigns, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2007, at A1. 
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about their roles or knowledge regarding the firings.9  Their 
efforts however have been rebuked.  Subpoenaed White House 
officials including Harriet Miers and Karl Rove have refused to 
testify, asserting “executive privilege.”10 In response, Congress 
has initiated proceedings to hold these officials in contempt, 
invoking 2 U.S.C. sections 192 and 194, an infrequently used 
statutory power which under certain circumstances authorizes 
Congress to issue criminal contempt citations against an 
individual who refuses to comply with a subpoena.11  
Thus, the stage is set for an all-out battle between Congress 
and the White House over access to information.  Put in a 
broader perspective, this conflict implicates the fundamental 
principle of separation of powers, which has been blurred under 
the auspices of the Bush Administration.   
                                                
9 See Steve Mills, 10 Things You Might Want to Know About 
Executive Privilege, Chi. Trib., Mar.. 25, 2007, at C2 
(providing a brief overview of some of the features of executive 
privilege). See also, Dan Eggan & Paul Kane, supra note 1. 
10 Mills, supra note 9; see also Bush in Conflict with Lawmakers 
on Prosecutors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2007, at A1; Mr. Rove Gets 
out of Town, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2007, at A20. 
11 See Neil A. Lewis, Panel Edgers Closer to Holding Former Aide 
in Contempt, N.Y.Times, July 13, 2007, at A13. 
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This note seeks not to analyze the abuse of executive 
privilege but rather focuses on Congress’ remedy against it-
namely contempt citations.   
Part I outlines the basic doctrine of executive privilege and 
analyzes its connection to Congress’ power to conduct 
investigations.  Part II then discusses the history and scope of 
Congress’ power to hold individuals who refuse to heed to its 
subpoenas in contempt.  Specifically, Part II analyzes three 
manifestations of the contempt power: inherent contempt, 
criminal contempt, and civil contempt.  This discussion will 
also compare the strengths and weaknesses of each mode of the 
contempt power.   
Part III discusses the official position of the Department of 
Justice on the Congressional contempt power and how that has 
historically and presently influenced its exercise.  Part IV 
tracks Congress’ current use of the contempt power in its quest 
to investigate the U.S. Attorney firings. This section concludes 
with exposing the inherent flaw in the criminal contempt power 
which threatens to undermine its effectiveness.  The apparent 
dilemma is that in order to issue a contempt citation, Congress 
must refer the matter to the U.S. Attorney, who bears the 
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responsibility of submitting the matter to a grand jury.12  This 
section concludes with pointing out that it is unrealistic for 
the U.S. Attorney to follow through with this duty, given that 
it is a direct action against itself.   
Finally, Part V proposes a judicial solution which circumvents 
the inherent problems with the contempt citation remedy. 
Specifically, this proposal suggests that a three judge panel be 
convened to determine whether the congressional subpoenas are 
valid over objections of executive privilege.  This judicial 
alternative requires appointing an independent prosecutor to 
bring the case on behalf of Congress before the panel for 
adjudication.  The panel would ultimately decide whether or not 
to issue an injunction ordering the White House officials to 
submit to the subpoenas.   
When the legislative and executive branches are beyond 
reconciliation, as they are today, only a judicial remedy can 
preserve the balance of power.  This proposal thus aims to use 
judicial integrity to restore public confidence in the 
                                                
12 See 2 U.S.C. §194 ((1982) (“it shall be the duty of the said 
President of the Senate or Speaker of the House...to 
certify...the statement of facts...to the appropriate United 
States attorney, whose duty it shall be to bring the matter 
before the grand jury for its action.”). 
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government in terms of the relationship between Congress and the 
Executive on such sensitive issues. 
I. Overview of Executive Privilege 
The scope of Congress’ ability to investigate the operations 
of the executive branch is inexorably tied to the doctrine of 
executive privilege.  Thus, in order to analyze Congress’ power 
of contempt, it is first necessary to visit the doctrine of 
executive privilege, for contempt is a direct remedy against its 
abuses.  The idea behind executive privilege is that members of 
the executive branch can preclude Congress and/or the courts, 
and ultimately the public from accessing documents, probing 
conversations, and hearing testimony on the grounds that the 
Constitution grants the President a right to secrecy when it 
comes to issues of national security and protecting privacy when 
it is in the best interest of the public.13  Executive privilege 
however, is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but 
rather has been interpreted as emanating from the constitutional 
powers granted to the President under the vesting clause of 
                                                
13 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the 
Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1143, 
1148 (1999); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern 
Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1069 (1999). 
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Article II, and the Commander in Chief Clause, and derived from 
the basic construct of separation of powers.14   
Executive privilege enjoys a long history of being invoked by 
many presidents, dating as far back as George Washington and 
Thomas Jefferson.15  In more recent times, the Supreme Court has 
validated executive privilege in United States v. Nixon, where 
although the Court held that executive privilege did not shield 
Nixon from withholding classified tapes and documents, it 
simultaneously affirmed the validity of executive privilege in 
other circumstances.16  In evaluating the interests of the 
President and his officials, the Court found that “the privilege 
is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably 
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”17   
While the Court recognized a qualified privilege, it seemed to 
limit its application to certain contexts, particularly to 
claims of the need to protect national security.18  Under other 
                                                
14 See Mills, supra note 9; Prakash, supra note 13, at 1143; 
Const. Art. II §1-2. 
15 See Mills, supra note 9; Rozell supra note 13, at 1069. 
16 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 684-5 (1974). 
17 Id. at 708. 
18 Id. at 706 (“Absent a claim of need to protect military, 
diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it 
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circumstances, it is less clear whether executive privilege will 
trump Congressional subpoenas.  In Walker v. Cheney, one of the 
rare recent cases addressing executive privilege, the Court 
sided with the administration in its refusal to disclose records 
from Vice President Dick Cheney’s Energy Task Force.19  
Despite the Court’s decisions in U.S. v. Nixon and Walker v. 
Cheney, courts have generally shied away from stepping in to 
adjudicate conflicts between the legislative and executive over 
executive privilege.20  Moreover, few such disputes have even 
made it to the courts because for the most part, the conflicts 
are negotiated on the political playing field; “one side usually 
blinks first, and a court fight is averted.”21  One journalist 
                                                
difficult to accept the argument that even the very important 
interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is 
significantly diminished by production of such material....”). 
19 Walker v. Cheney, 230 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
20 Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive 
Privilege Revisited, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 489, 500 (2007). 
21 Mills, supra note 9. See also, Morton Rosenberg & Todd B. 
Tatelman, Presidential claims of executive privilege: history, 
law practice and recent developments, CRS Reports, July 1, 2007. 
“Few such interbranch disputes over access to information have 
reached the courts for substantive resolution, the vast majority 
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offers the reason for this preference being that “political 
imperatives often trump high-brow legal principles.  A White 
House that looks as if it is hiding something pays a political 
price.  The same is true of a Congress that looks too much like 
an inquisition.”22  Therefore, judicial precedent or guidance for 
defining the boundaries of executive privilege is lacking.   
This is especially disconcerting given that the Bush 
Administration can be characterized by an attempt to expand the 
scope of executive privilege.23  According to legal scholar Mark 
Rozell, “President Bush chose some very nontraditional cases for 
reestablishing executive privilege.”24  Examples include where 
the President attempted to expand the scope of executive 
privilege for former presidents, and where the Bush 
administration endeavored to apply the doctrine to protect 
                                                
achieving resolution through political negotiation and 
accommodation.” Id. at 1. 
22 Bush, Democrats Posture on Firings, Now, Let’s Make a Deal, 
USA Today, March 23, 2007, at A14. 
23 For a lengthy discussion about the implications of executive 
privilege in the Bush Administration, see Mark J. Rozell, 
Executive Privlege Revived?:  Secrecy and Conflict During the 
Bush Presidency, 52 Duke L.J. 403 (2002). 
24 Id.,at 407. 
 11 
Department of Justice documents from investigations that had 
already been closed.25  Stated by Rozell, “[t]he common thread in 
the Bush Administration case is the use of executive privilege 
in circumstances where there is little precedent for such 
action.”26 The Bush Administration’s attempts at expanding 
executive privilege have come to a head in the U.S. Attorney 
scandal, where members of the executive branch have asserted 
executive privilege in order to escape testifying and 
publicizing documents.   
In response to Congressional demands for testimony and 
documents, the administration has agreed to release certain e-
mails from within the Justice Department “but has drawn the line 
at releasing communications among members of the White House 
staff, citing the tradition that a president is entitled to 
advice from his aides that does not have to be couched out of 
concern that it will become public.”27  Invoking the shield of 
executive privilege, President Bush made it clear that he would 
oppose any subpoenas brought against White House officials, 
                                                
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Sherly Gay Stolberg, Bush in Conflict with Lawmakers on 
Prosecutions, N.Y.Times, March 21, 2007, at A1. 
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stating that “We will not go along with a partisan fishing 
expedition aimed at honorable public servants.”28 
The pertinent question is whether absent direct judicial 
findings regarding the validity of executive privilege claims, 
Congress has any effective means with which to test such 
assertions.  The next section will discuss Congress’ power to 
issue contempt citations as a remedy against the claims of 
executive privilege.   
 
II. Congress’ Remedy: The Contempt Power 
A. Investigatory Authority: The Scope 
Just as the Constitution fails to explicitly mention executive 
privilege, so too does it lack any direct reference to Congress’ 
power to issue contempt citations.  Rather, Congress’ authority 
to issue contempt citations derives from its Article I powers 
and the overarching doctrine of separation of powers.29  It is 
                                                
28 Id. 
29 See Morton Rosenberg & Todd Tatelman, Congress’s contempt 
power: a sketch, CRS Report RL34119, August 1, 2007 at 1 (“While 
there is no express provision of the Constitution or specific 
statute authorizing the conduct of congressional oversight or 
investigations, the Supreme Court has firmly established that 
such power is essential to the legislative function as to be 
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further validated by a long history of its implementation, 
recognition by the Supreme Court, and its eventual incorporation 
into statute.30  Moreover, “[t]he power of Congress to punish for 
                                                
implied from the general vesting of legislative powers in 
Congress”). See also, U.S. Const. art. I, §1 (“All legislative 
powers...shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, 
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of 
Representatives.”). 
30 Congress first used the contempt powering 1795, when three 
members of the House of Representatives issued contempt 
citations against two individuals who reportedly attempted to 
bribe them.  Morton Rosenberg & Todd B. Tatelman, Congress’ 
Contempt Power: A Sketch, CRS Report RL34119, August 1, 2007, at 
3.  Under the contempt power, the House proceeded to arrest and 
detain the accused pending further investigation.  Id.  The 
first time the Supreme Court upheed the constitutionality of the 
contempt power was in 1821, in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 
(1821).  “Between 1795 and 1857, 14 inherent contempt actions 
were initiated by the House and Senate” and because the existing 
procedure at the time seemed inefficient, “[i]n 1857, a 
statutory criminal contempt procedure was enacted....” Id. at7. 
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contempt is inextricably related to the power of Congress to 
investigate.”31   
In McGrain v. Daughtery, the Supreme Court validated Congress’ 
authority to conduct oversight and investigations.32  The facts 
of McGrain are startlingly similar to the scandal surrounding 
the Department of Justice today.  Harry M. Daughtery had been 
the Attorney General from 1921-1924, and was the central figure 
surrounding a Senate investigation of various charges of 
misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of Justice under 
his reign.33 The Senate committee heading the investigation 
subpoenaed the former Attorney General’s brother, commanding him 
to give testimony and submit documents that were suspected to 
corroborate suspicions of unethical activity.34  The summoned 
individual failed to appear.35  In determining whether Congress 
had the power to compel a private individual to appear before 
it, the Court opined that  
[T]he power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an 
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative 
                                                
31 Morton Rosenberg & Todd B. Tatelman, Congress’ Contempt Power: 
A Sketch, CRS Report RL34119, August 1, 2007. 
32 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
33 Id. at 151. 
34 Id. at 152. 
35 Id. 
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function....[A] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or 
effectively in the absence of information respecting the 
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or 
change....36   
 
Subsequent Court rulings such as Eastland v. United States 
Servicemen’s Fund37 and Watkins v. United States38 have reaffirmed 
Congress’ power to investigate.  In Eastland, the subpoena 
issued on behalf of a Senate subcommittee directing that a 
certain bank produce all its records pertaining to the United 
States Servicemen’s Fund, was met with refusal. The Court held 
that that Congress’ authority to issue subpoenas falls within 
the sphere of the Speech and Debate clause of the Constitution.39  
The Court found that authority to issue a subpoena in the midst 
of an investigation is “an indispensable ingredient of law 
making” without which Congress’ role of lawmaking and 
deliberating “would be meaningless.”40  
 Similarly, in Watkins, where the petitioner was held in 
contempt for failing to make certain disclosures to the Un-
American Activities Committee, the Court once again defined the 
                                                
36 Id. at 175. 
37 Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 
(1975). 
38 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
39 Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501. 
40 Id. at 505. 
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scope of Congress’ investigative powers as “broad” in that it 
“encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing 
laws as well as proposed or possible needed statutes.”41  
Although the Court ultimately held that petitioner’s conviction 
for refusal to answer was invalid under due process, it made a 
point of validating Congress’ power to issue contempt citations 
as derived from its right to inquiry.42 
In Wilkinson v. United States, the Court set forth five 
requirements for the validity of a Congressional subpoena.43  
These include: 1)the investigation must be authorized by 
Congress; 2)the subcommittee must be pursuing a valid 
legislative purpose; 3)the question asked the subpoenaed 
individual must be pertinent to the subject matter of the 
investigation; 4) the individual must be apprised of the 
pertinence of the question; and 5) the subcommittee’s 
interrogation cannot violate the subpoenaed individual’s First 
Amendment rights.44   
As reiterated by the Court in Barenblatt v. United States, 
“The scope of the power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating 
                                                
41 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. 
42 Id. 
43 Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 408-9 (1961). 
44 Id. 
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and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate 
under the Constitution.”45 
Given the Court’s affirmation of both the value of and the 
validity for Congress’ power to investigate, it naturally 
follows that Congress should have the means with which to 
enforce its subpoenas; and it does.  Congress possesses the 
power to put those individuals who refuse to answer subpoenas in 
contempt.  There are three means through which Congress can 
employ its contempt power: 1) inherent contempt; 2) statutory 
criminal contempt; and 3) civil contempt.  These three 
approaches are discussed below. 
B. Inherent Contempt 
Before the power to issue contempt citations was codified 
by statute, Congress had an inherent contempt power wielded 
throughout history and verified by the Supreme Court.  Anderson 
v. Dunn represents the first case in which the Supreme Court 
expressly acknowledged this power as inherent and valid. 46  In 
Anderson, the Court considered the argument that the power of 
Congress to punish for contempt can only be employed pursuant to 
a legislative grant, but ultimately found that the interests of 
Congress in effectively representing the American people were 
                                                
45 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959). 
46 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821). 
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more persuasive.47  In holding that Congress indeed had an 
inherent contempt power, the Court reasoned that the right to 
punish for contempt is essential to maintaining the dignity of 
and confidence in Congress as a legislative assembly.48 
In their report on Congress’s contempt power for the 
Congressional Research Service, Morton Rosenberg and Todd B. 
Tatelman explain the process for holding an individual in 
contempt under the inherent contempt power.49  The process begins 
when the offending individual is brought before the House or 
Senate by the Sergeant-at-Arms, is then tried at the bar of the 
body, and finally can be imprisoned in the Capitol jail.50  The 
imprisonment can be punitive, lasting for a specific period of 
time as punishment, or coercive, for an indefinite period until 
the witness agrees to comply.51  There have also been instances 
where the Court has seemingly approved of imposing fines as 
                                                
47 Id., at 29. 
48 Id. at 30, 31. 
49 Morton Rosenberg & Todd B. Tatelman, Inherent Contempt; 
Congress’ Contempt Power: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure, 
CRS Reports, July 1, 2007. 
50 Id. at 1.  
51 Id. See also, McGrain v. Daughtery, 273 U.S. at 161. 
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opposed to imprisonment.52  Inherent contempt proceedings can be 
distinguished from other types of contempt proceedings in that 
inherent contempt does not require the oversight or cooperation 
of either the executive or judicial branches.”53  In other words, 
inherent contempt only requires the approval of the chamber 
concerned. 
Inherent contempt however, is not without its limitations.  
In Kilbourn v. Thompson, the Court delineated the boundaries for 
when Congress can exercise the contempt power.54 In Kilbourn, the 
House of Representative initiated contempt proceedings with 
imprisonment as the penalty, against a witness who refused to 
answer questions concerning the business of a real-estate 
partnership of which he was a member.55  In recognizing the 
existence of the contempt power, the Court would curb the 
doctrine to “a limited class of cases, or under special 
                                                
52 Rosenberg and Tatelman, supra note 42 at 2; Anderson v. Dunn, 
19 U.S. at 227, 228; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 
U.S. 258 (1957) (upholding a fine against a labor union as 
punishment for disobedience and an incentive to dismantle a 
strike). 
53 Rosenberg and Tatelman, supra note 45 at 3. 
54 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). 
55 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). 
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circumstances; otherwise the limitation is unavailing and the 
power omnipotent.”56  The Court suggested that each body of 
Congress is confined in executing the contempt power to 
situations in which it is acting pursuant to its appropriate 
sphere; for instance, when it is disciplining its own members, 
evaluating their elections, or conducting impeachment 
proceedings.57  
 In sum, after Kilbourn, it was clear that although the 
Court recognized some degree of an inherent contempt power, it 
came with material limitations.  Perhaps this is why the 
inherent contempt power was last formally used in 1934.58  
Furthermore, inherent contempt has been criticized for other 
reasons as well.  According to Rosenberg, “inherent contempt has 
been described as ‘unseemly’, cumbersome, time-consuming, and 
relatively ineffective, especially for a modern Congress with a 
heavy legislative workload that would be interrupted by a trial 
at the bar.”59  Although the flaws of inherent contempt 
ultimately render it an ineffective tool for Congress, the 
                                                
56 Id. at 197. 
57 Id., at 190-192. For a summary of Kilbourn, see Rosenberg & 
Tatelman, supra note 29, at 4-5. 
58 Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 6.  
59 Id., at 6-7. 
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Court’s recognition of its existence gives Congress some muscle 
with which to exercise its authority to investigate  
Statutory Criminal Contempt 
A more practical procedure comes in the form of statutory 
criminal contempt.  In 1857, Congress passed a federal statute 
providing for criminal punishment for contempt, shifting the 
inherent contempt power into an authority more concrete and 
tangible. 60  According to the Court in Chapman v. United States, 
throughout history, when Congress has attempted to gain 
compliance with its subpoenas, it has encountered impenetrable 
obstacles in the form of “unwilling and contumacious witnesses,” 
for which the inherent contempt power was not equipped to 
overcome. “It was for the remedy of this evil that the act of 
1857 was passed.”61 Today, statutory contempt is codified under 2 
U.S.C. §192 and §194. Under §192, 
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the 
authority of either House, or any joint committee 
established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two 
Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of 
                                                
60 Ronald L. Goldfarb, The Contempt Power, 40 (1963).  See also, 
Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access 
Disputes: A Modest Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 Admin. L. Rev. 109, 
116 (1996) (discussing the history and feasibility of the 
contempt power and proposing to maintain the status quo). 
61 Chapman v. United States, 5 App. D.C.Cir. 122 (1895). 
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Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, 
refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question 
under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, 
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than 
$100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than 
one month nor more that twelve months. 
 
Section 194 explains how the process functions when the 
individual subpoenaed fails to appear or testify, or fails to 
produce the requested documents and information: “[t]he failure 
or refusal is reported to either House in the form of a 
statement of fact, the presiding officer of that House is to 
certify the statement to the appropriate United States Attorney, 
who is to bring the matter before a grand jury.”62 Additionally, 
“a formal report to Congress, made by the committee before whom 
the alleged statutory offense was committed is also said to be a 
prerequisite to a court trial.”63 Finally, “[t]he procedure 
prescribed for initiating criminal contempt proceedings is 
mandatory... [and] Congress, by providing for grand jury action, 
placed a duty on the federal courts to accord persons prosecuted 
                                                
62 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt §229; 2 U.S.C. § 192. It is unclear 
whether the U.S. Attorney has a mandatory or discretionary duty 
to refer the matter to a grand jury, but this distinction will 
prove to be highly important to the issue of whether the statute 
is an effective remedy for the assertions of executive privilege 
out of the current U.S. Attorney situation. 
63 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt §229. 
 23 
under the contempt of Congress such safeguards as would be 
accorded in other federal criminal cases.”64  Most importantly, 
section 194 shifts the enforcement of criminal contempt 
citations to the courts. 
In Russell v United States, where Congress initiated 
prosecutions for refusal to testify, the Court found that one 
requirement for a section 192 criminal contempt proceeding is 
that the indictment “must identify the subject which was under 
inquiry at the time of the defendant’s alleged default or 
refusal to answer.”65  The Court stressed that “at the very core 
of criminality under 2 U.S.C. §192, is pertinency to the subject 
under inquiry of the questions which the defendant refused to 
answer.”66  Thus, in order to ensure that the proper procedural 
safeguards are in place, “an indictment must do more than simply 
repeat the language of the criminal statute.”67 
According to Rosenberg and Tatelman, in their report on 
Congress’ contempt power, “The criminal contempt statute and 
corresponding procedure are punitive in nature.  It is used when 
the House or Senate wants to punish a recalcitrant witness and, 
                                                
64 Id. 
65 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962). 
66 Id., at 764. 
67 Id. 
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by doing so, to deter others from similar contumacious 
conduct.”68  Thus, the goal of criminal contempt proceedings is 
not coercion, that is, not an attempt to bring the witness into 
compliance, but rather to punish. 
Since the contempt power is inextricably linked to 
Congress’ authority to make inquiries, its availability as a 
remedy depends on whether the initial investigation is within 
Congress’ legislative domain.69 However, in Chapman v. U.S., the 
court recognized that “[t]here is a great difficulty in clearly 
and distinctly marking the boundaries within which Congress may 
act with coercive power to compel the disclosure of facts deemed 
important to it....” The Court found however, that because the 
matter under senate investigation directly affected the Senate 
itself because it involved the actions and integrity of some of 
its own members, there was no doubt that the Senate acted within 
the scope of its authority in implicating the criminal contempt 
statute.70  This case makes it apparent that the statutory 
criminal contempt power is also subject to the requirement that 
                                                
68 Rosenberg and Tatelman, supra note 29, at 8. 
69 7A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 17:57. See discussion supra Part 
III.A. 
70 Chapman v. U.S., 5 App. D.C.Cir., at 9. 
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the body of Congress must be acting within certain 
constitutional and legislative bounds. 
In Barenblatt, the Court analyzed whether §192 was 
appropriately applied to punish an individual for contempt for 
his refusal to answer certain questions posed to him by a 
Subcommittee of the House Committee of Un-American Activities, 
regarding alleged Communist infiltration into the field of 
education.71  When the petitioner refused to testify, invoking 
the 5th Amendment, the matter was referred to the U.S. Attorney 
for the District of Colombia to initiate contempt proceedings.72  
In holding that the contempt proceedings did not violate the 
petitioner’s First Amendment rights, the Court confirmed the 
overall constitutionality of section 192.73 
Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the criminal 
contempt statute is that it confers jurisdiction on the courts 
to be the final arbitrators of such disputes between the 
                                                
71 Barenblatt vs. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 114 (1959).  The 
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member of the Communist Party? Have you ever been a member of 
the Communist Party?” to name a few. 
72 Id. at 115. 
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executive and legislative branches.  However, whether the courts 
eventually hear the case is within the discretion of the 
appropriate U.S. attorney.  Thus, the effectiveness of this 
remedy is contingent upon prosecutorial discretion; there is no 
guarantee that it will be pursued. 
D. Civil Contempt 
The final avenue Congress has available to enforce its 
investigatory and subpoena powers is through the civil contempt 
procedure.  Enacted in 1978 as part of the Ethics in Government 
Act, 2 U.S.C. §288b-d and 28 U.S.C. §1365 authorized only the 
Senate, and not the House, to bring a civil suit to enforce its 
subpoenas.74 Section 1365 grants the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia original jurisdiction over Senate actions 
to enforce subpoenas.75  The statute provides for the Office of 
Senate Legal Counsel to represent the Senate in bringing such 
actions before the proper court.76  Under the civil statute, when 
the Senate seeks to enforce a judgment concerning a subpoena, 
                                                
74 28 U.S.C §1365; 2 U.S.C. §288b-d; P.L. 95-521, Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978 (Passed in the wake of the Watergate 
scandal in order to adjust the balance of power between Congress 
and the White House).  
75 Id.  
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“the court will first review the subpoena’s validity.  If the 
court finds that the subpoena ‘does not meet applicable legal 
standards for enforcement,’ it does not have jurisdiction to 
enjoin the congressional proceeding.”77  
 One of the chief restrictions of civil contempt is that it 
includes an exception for enforcement of “any subpoena or order 
issued to an officer or employee of the executive branch of the 
Federal Government acting within his or her official 
capacity...”78  In other words, it cannot be employed against a 
member of the executive branch as long as that individual can be 
deemed to be operating in the scope of his or her executive 
duty. Whether this applies to former executive officials is 
unclear.  However, this limitation directly impedes Congress’ 
ability to enforce subpoenas relating to the U.S. Attorney 
firings investigation given that the subpoenaed individuals were 
recently or are currently White House officials.  The civil 
contempt statute is thus an ineffective remedy for Congress to 
assert its authority. 
C. Statutory Versus Civil: An Important Distinction 
Given the existence of both criminal and civil remedies for 
contempt of Congress, it is important to highlight the 
differences and consequences in utilizing one in lieu of the 
                                                
77 Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 29, at 13. 
78 28 U.S.C. §1365. 
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other.  One may ask why the Senate would elect to pursue the 
civil route as opposed to the more extreme criminal remedy.  
According to Rosenberg and Tatelman, “civil contempt might be 
employed when the Senate is more concerned with securing 
compliance with the subpoena or with clarifying legal issues 
than with punishing the contemnor” because in contrast to 
criminal contempt, “in a civil contempt, sanctions can be 
imposed until the subpoenaed party agrees to comply....”79 
Criminal contempt on the other hand, “may not be purged by 
agreeing to testify or produce documents....”80 According to 
legal scholar Todd D. Peterson in his analysis of the contempt 
power, this difference can have a tremendous impact in the 
context of congressional investigations because it demands “a 
witness must risk a criminal conviction in order to challenge a 
congressional subpoena or to assert a claim of privilege.”81 
Additionally, the civil contempt process can be viewed as 
more advantageous to Congress because since the stakes are 
higher in criminal proceedings, “a court may more closely 
scrutinize congressional procedures and give greater weight to 
                                                
79 Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 29 at 13. 
80 Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for 
Contempt of Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 563, 611 (1991). 
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the defendant’s constitutional rights.”82 In criminal 
proceedings, the sanctions are more severe and are therefore “a 
more threatening and potentially abusive process.”83  Seen from 
this angle, Congress may hedge its bets and decide that civil 
proceedings could result in a more favorable outcome. 
On the other hand, the very fact that the punishment for 
criminal contempt is harsh could make it a more effective tool 
for Congress.  Perhaps the threat of criminal contempt will be 
taken more seriously by recalcitrant witnesses than the more 
innocuous civil contempt.  Moreover, unlike civil contempt, the 
criminal contempt statute does not carve out an entire exception 
for members of the executive branch acting within their 
appropriate roles which therefore makes it a more effective 
remedy when it is a member of the executive branch who is 
subpoenaed.  In sum, both the criminal and civil powers of 
contempt are accompanied by certain limitations that potentially 
threaten their effectiveness as a remedy.  An analysis of how 
this will play out in light of the U.S. Attorney firings 
investigation is discussed in Section V. 
 
 
 
                                                
82 Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 29 at 12. 
83 Peterson, supra note 78, at 612. 
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III. Department of Justice’s Position on Contempt 
In 1984, a memorandum by the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) 
was sent out to the Attorney General, expressing a formal 
opinion regarding how amendable a member of the executive is to 
indictment and criminal prosecution.84 The opinions coming out of 
the OLC are designed to assist the Attorney General in his 
function as legal advisor to the President. 85  According, they 
affect executive policies and are thus highly influential. 
Essentially, the position of the OLC on statutory criminal 
contempt is that “[a] United States Attorney is not required to 
refer a congressional contempt citation to a grand jury or 
otherwise to refer a congressional contempt citation to a grand 
jury or otherwise to prosecute an Executive Branch official who 
carries out the President’s instruction to invoke the 
President’s claim of executive privilege....”86   
The OLC’s report was a direct response to an investigation led 
by the House into the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) 
                                                
84 See Prosecution for the Contempt of Congress of an Executive 
Branch Official Who has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 
8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 101 (1984) [hereinafter Olson 
Memo]. 
85 http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ 
86 Olson Memo, at 1. 
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enforcement of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980(“CERCLA”).87  The 
subpoenas issued by two subcommittees of the House demanded 
documents from the EPA’s files. 88  Under the guide of President 
Reagan, EPA Administrator, Anne Burford, refused to hand over 
the documents, asserting executive privilege.89  According to the 
OLC, the question of whether 2 U.S.C. §194 mandates that the 
U.S. Attorney pursue the contempt citation, hinges on statutory 
construction and separation of powers considerations.90   
Regarding separation of powers, the OLC’s takes the 
perspective that if Congress were able to criminalize the 
assertion of “a presumptively valid claim” of executive 
privilege, “the exercise of [that] privilege would be so 
burdened as to be nullified.”91  Moreover, the OLC memo states 
that “even the threat of a criminal prosecution for asserting 
the claim is an unreasonable, unwarranted, and therefore 
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intolerable burden on the exercise by the President of his 
functions under the Constitution.”92  Ultimately, the memo 
suggests that the congressional action of placing a member of 
the executive in criminal contempt amounts to Congress 
overstepping its authority at the expense of the executive 
branch, thus eroding the separation of powers. 
However, it is important to note that the memo specifically 
points out that its “conclusions are limited to the unique 
circumstances that gave rise to these questions in late 1982 and 
early 1983”93-namely the EPA controversy.  This caveat is crucial 
because it begs the question of whether the reasoning behind the 
OLC opinion can be similarly applied to the contempt proceedings 
arising out of the U.S. Attorney firings investigation.   
  It is not surprising that an opinion compiled by the OLC 
will defend executive privilege, for the OLC itself is an 
executive agency. However, it does give the executive legs on 
which to argue the unconstitutionality of criminal contempt.  If 
the law is as the OLC suggests, this would mean that a 
congressional investigation into the U.S. Attorney firings would 
be virtually impossible.  
                                                
92 Id. at 2, 3. 
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 However, Stanley Brand, the Democratic House counsel during 
the Burford cases, criticized the OLC’s stance as “turn[ing] the 
constitutional enforcement process on its head.  They are saying 
they will always place a claim of presidential privilege without 
any judicial determination above a congressional demand for 
evidence-without any basis in law.”94  Brand goes further to 
interpret the OLC’s words as saying to Congress, “[b]ecause we 
control the enforcement process, we are going to thumb our nose 
at you.”95  Therefore, although the OLC opinion offers insight 
into how the executive branch views the conflict, it does not 
necessarily mean that it should be given substantial weight. 
 
IV. Application to the U.S. Attorney Investigation 
Assertions of executive privilege have “stonewalled” 
Congress’s investigation into the U.S. Attorney firings.96  As a 
result, “Congressional leaders are armed with subpoenas and 
contempt citations, and are threatening to conduct a perjury 
                                                
94 Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Broader Privilege Claimed in 
Firings; White House Says Hill Can’t Pursue Contempt Cases, 
Wash. Post, July 20, 2007, at A1. 
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96 See, Mr. Rove Gets Out of Town, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2007 at 
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investigation and seek a special counsel.”97  Senator Patrick 
Leahy, head of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has made it clear 
that Congress will meet such refusals by issuing criminal 
contempt citations.98  In fact, the House Judiciary Committee has 
officially issued criminal contempt citations against White 
House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten and former White House counsel 
Harriet Miers.99  However, “the White House has signaled it will 
block federal prosecutors from pursuing them.”100  The obstinacy 
of both Congress and the White House has led to a political 
conundrum: both sides have asserted constitutionally and 
judicially recognized powers (contempt and executive privilege) 
that are inherently at odds.  Whether Congress or the White 
House will prevail is the million dollar question. 
Whether Congress can prevail depends on the scope of the 
contempt power.  If, as the OLC suggests, the criminal contempt 
power can not be implemented against a claim of executive 
privilege, it stands to reason that Congress’ efforts to probe 
into the details of the firings will be stymied.  If, on the 
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other hand, Congress’s power to issue criminal contempt 
citations is recognized as a valid and essential tool for 
oversight of executive activities, then indeed, Congress may be 
able to get around the barriers of executive privilege.   
Ironically, one of the chief obstacles Congress faces in 
implementing criminal contempt citations is not the obstinacy of 
the White House, but rather the provisions of the criminal 
contempt statute itself.  A key step in the process of pursuing 
criminal contempt is that Congress must refer the matter to the 
U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.101  This results in 
an unprecedented conflict because the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
itself is the subject of the underlying investigation.  The 
criminal contempt proceedings would thus mandate that the U.S. 
Attorney, an arm of the executive branch, act directly against 
itself. 
Relying on the OLC memo, “administration officials argued [] 
that Congress has no power to force a U.S. attorney to pursue 
contempt charges in cases...in which the president has declared 
that testimony or documents are protected from release by 
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executive privilege.”102 One anonymous official stated that “[i]t 
has long been understood that, in circumstances like these, the 
constitutional prerogatives of the president would make it a 
futile and purely political act for Congress to refer contempt 
citations to U.S. attorneys.”103   
Further insight into how the matter will pan out lies in 
Attorney general nominee, Michael B. Mukasy’s responses to 
questions put forth by the Senate Judiciary Committee during his 
confirmation hearings.104  During the questioning, “Mukasey 
indicated it would be hard for the Justice Department to 
prosecute [former White House officials] under [these] 
circumstances because department lawyers were the ones who gave 
advice to the White House that the officials could properly 
assert [executive] privilege.”105  He went on to confirm that 
“the department, under both Democratic and Republican 
administrations, has made it a policy of declining to prosecute 
under those circumstances.”106 
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Therefore, as Christopher H. Schroeder (Duke University law 
professor and OLC deputy chief from 1994 to 1999) puts it, the 
administration’s position “as a legal matter may leave the 
Democrats without an effective remedy.”107  If indeed Congress is 
powerless to force the U.S. Attorney to act against the 
executive, then another option for resolving the matter must be 
explored. 
V. Proposal 
Before proposing a solution for resolving this dispute, it is 
first necessary to briefly dispense with the historic legal 
alternatives to criminal contempt.  
A. Inherent Contempt is Doomed 
First, an argument that Congress can avoid the pitfalls of 
criminal contempt by resurrecting inherent contempt is doomed.   
Although with inherent contempt Congress could hold its own 
trials, thus avoiding referring the matter to the U.S. attorney, 
inherent contempt has not been used since 1934 and with good 
reason.  It has been characterized as “unseemly, cumbersome, 
time-consuming, and relatively ineffective, especially for a 
modern Congress with a heavy legislative workload that would be 
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interrupted by at trial at the bar.”108 There is no reason to 
suggest that as applied to the U.S. Attorney investigations, 
these problems would disappear.  
 Finally, as articulated in a newspaper report, “The prospect 
of a congressional sergeant-at-arms arresting former White House 
Counsel Miers, holding her in custody somewhere on Capitol Hill, 
and Congress trying her is unlikely.”109    
B. Civil Contempt is Doomed 
 Resorting to the civil remedy is also an untenable option.  
Civil contempt is impractical for two reasons.  First, it can 
only be implemented by the Senate, which substantially 
diminishes its power and weight.  Second, and even more 
importantly, the civil remedy is doomed simply because “it 
authorizes a suit against any person subpoenaed except an 
officer or employee of the federal government.110  Thus, for all 
its merits, the civil contempt remedy is inapplicable to the 
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U.S. Attorney investigation because the subpoenaed individuals 
are officials of the executive branch.111 
C. A Judicial Solution: Time for the Courts to Revisit 
U.S. v. Nixon  
Both Congress and the White House assert deeply rooted 
constitutional powers (executive privilege and contempt 
citations) that are inherently at odds.  Only the courts have 
the independence and authority to ultimately determine which 
power shall prevail in this controversy.  The matter should be 
brought before the judiciary in order to determine whether 
Congress’ subpoenas are enforceable over objections of executive 
privilege.  In essence, the Court should revisit United States 
v. Nixon.112   
                                                
111 An argument could be made that since Harriet Miers and Karl 
Rove resigned from the Bush Administration, they are no longer 
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 40 
 A judicial resolution to the standoff between Congress and 
the Executive branch is not a novel idea.  Rather, it harkens 
back to the most fundamental feature of the United States 
government: separation of powers.  When two branches of the 
government are at severe odds, where each is convinced that its 
authority trumps the other’s, the courts step in to mediate.  
 This triumvirate system, in which the courts are the final 
arbitrators, traces it roots to Marbury v. Madison, where the 
Court first established its power of judicial review.113  By 
granting the Court the authority to “speak the law” when a 
constitutional right is at issue, Marbury elevated the status of 
the Court from that of a co-equal branch, to the final overseer 
of executive or legislative actions in which an individual right 
is at stake.114  Marbury thus represents long-established 
precedent for a judicial remedy when the legislative and 
executive branches are in disputes over the scope of their 
constitutional powers.   
Although courts have generally shied away from adjudicating 
controversies between the executive branch and Congress, 
considering them to be political battles in which the Court 
plays a limited role, if ever there were a need for judicial 
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oversight, now is the time.  Just as the Court in U.S. v. Nixon 
determined whether executive privilege shielded the President 
from turning over subpoenaed information, the Court should do 
the same today. 
However, a very specific judicial procedure needs to be in 
place for the adjudication of disputes over executive privilege 
and congressional subpoenas.  Although the criminal contempt 
statute does ultimately involve a judicial remedy, the courts 
only come into play if the U.S. Attorney decides to pursue the 
case.  Instead of pushing the case through the U.S. Attorney, 
Congress should enact legislation to appoint an independent 
counsel to prosecute its case.115  However, because special 
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Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), where the Court upheld 
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fire a prosecutor at will.  The statutory framework for an 
independent counsel derives from the Independent Reauthorization 
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prosecutors have not historically demonstrated their ability to 
be neutral116, it is crucial that all possible procedures are in 
place to ensure true independence. 
The best option would be for the Attorney General to 
recommend a special prosecutor for a specified term of years who 
would have to be approved by Congress.  This special prosecutor 
would have independent discretion within the Justice Department 
and could only be fired by a showing of good cause, reviewable 
by a court.  That way, both branches of the government have to 
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support the selection and the prosecutor does not have to answer 
to the Justice Department. Therefore, the first part of this 
proposal installs a special prosecutor, approved by both the 
Department of Justice and Congress to litigate the dispute.  
The second prong of this proposal establishes a three judge 
panel to rule on the issue of whether claims of executive 
privilege are proper. This judicial procedure would supplant 
sections 192 and 194 of the criminal contempt statute. Three 
judge panels are generally convened to adjudicate very narrow 
issues of the law, such as Voting Rights or congressional 
redistricting cases.117   
There are two main purposes of the three-judge panel 
system, both of which are applicable to the issue at hand.  
First, in such areas where this system is used, such as for 
Voting Rights and congressional redistricting cases, it is 
because “it is the judgment of the [Senate Judiciary] committee 
that these issues are of such importance that they ought to be 
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heard by a three-judge court....”118  The statutory intent in 
providing three judge panels is “to secure the public interest 
in a ‘limited class of cases of special importance.’”119 
Since it is the Senate Judiciary Committee which initiated 
contempt proceedings against the White House officials in the 
first place, it stands to reason that the committee would 
likewise deem refusals to answer its subpoenas in that category 
of issues so important as to warrant review by the collective 
judgment of three judges instead of one. Furthermore, just as 
Voting Rights cases are heard by a three-judge panel because 
they deeply implicate public interests, so too does the matter 
of congressional oversight and executive accountability cut 
right to heart of public confidence in the government. 
The second, perhaps more practical purpose of a three-judge 
scheme is “to expedite important litigation.”120  One of the 
drawbacks of a judicial resolution for controversies regarding 
executive privilege and congressional subpoenas is that the 
court system can be so time-consuming. By the time a contempt 
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case against Harrier Miers or Joshua Bolten edges its way 
through the courts, the political climate will probably have 
tempered-the momentum subsided. In other words, if the courts 
eventually decide to uphold the congressional subpoenas against 
Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten, by that time, it is likely that 
a new administration will already be in place.  Therefore, the 
impact of such a decision may be lost, for the public and even 
Congress will have probably moved on. However, a three panel 
judge procedure would expedite the process. 
 As a practical matter, in line with other procedures for 
the narrow set of disputes which trigger three judge panels, 
Congress would bring an action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, for injunctive relief on the 
ground that assertions of executive privilege are 
unconstitutional. 121  
 In delegating disputes over the validity of its subpoenas 
to a three-judge panel, Congress could model its statute after 2 
U.S.C. §922, which provides for three judges in adjudicating 
congressional attempts to eliminate budget deficits.122  This 
statute serves as an ideal template for Congress to follow 
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because it allows for any member of Congress to bring an action 
directly to the United States District Court of the District of 
Columbia without the downside of appointing the U.S. Attorney or 
a special prosecutor.123  In ensuring an expedited process, the 
statute imposes a duty on the District Court and the Supreme 
Court “to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest 
possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under 
[this] section.”124 
Any request for a three judge panel would have to be in 
accordance with in 28 U.S.C. §2284(b), which sets out the 
procedural requirements.125  Section 2284(b) provides that a 
request for three judges be presented to one of the district 
judges who would immediately notify the chief judge of the 
circuit.126  The chief circuit judge then bears the 
responsibility for designating two other judges, one of whom 
must be a circuit judge.127  Thus, the ultimate three judges 
would include the initial district judge to whom the request was 
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originally made, and two other judges, one of whom must be a 
circuit judge.128   
With precedent already established for a three-judge panel 
and a special prosecutor, all Congress has to do is enact the 
proper legislation to get the ball rolling.   
Conclusion 
Ten days after the House Judiciary Committee issued a report 
in favor of pursuing contempt proceedings129, a New York Times 
article stated that “[i]f Congress wants to maintain its 
Constitutional role, it needs to stand up for itself.”130  The 
bottom line is that Congress’ powers to enforce its subpoenas 
against claims of executive privilege are insufficient.  The 
criminal contempt power, in all its forms, is not an adequate 
tool with which to resolve the issue.   
In order to restore the balance of power within the 
government, all three branches need to perform their designated 
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roles.  In order for Congress to effectively legislate, it must 
possess the means by which to conduct a thorough investigation 
into allegations of corruption within the government.   At the 
same time, its investigative authority is not limitless.  Only 
the courts can draw those boundaries.  When the strategy of 
negotiation and compromise is exhausted, Congress should require 
the Attorney General to recommend a special prosecutor to be 
approved by Congress, who would litigate the dispute before a 
three-judge panel.  Indeed Congress will run the risk of losing; 
however, better an independent judiciary to decide than to give 
up the battle.    
 
 
 
